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Abstract. This paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation where the issues
are divisible, there are time constraints in the form of deadlines and discount
factors, and the agents have different preferences over the issues. The issues are
negotiated using the package deal procedure. The set of issues to be negotiated
is a choice variable in that the agents can decide what issues to negotiate. This
set is called the negotiation agenda. Since the outcome of negotiation depends on
the agenda, it is important to determine what agenda maximizes an agent’s utility
and is therefore its optimal agenda. To this end, this paper presents polynomial
time methods for ﬁnding an agent’s optimal agenda.
1 Introduction
Negotiation has long been studied by economists and game theorists but is now receiv-
ing increasing attention from researchers in multi-agent systems [10, 13]. In the existing
work, the analysis of negotiation typically begins with a given set of issues and the par-
ties’ preferences (in the form of their utilities) for different possible settlements of the
issues. Within this framework, theorists have investigated a range of negotiation proce-
dures such as the package deal procedure (PDP), the simultaneous procedure (SP), and
the sequential procedure (SQP) [7, 8, 2].
It is well known that different procedures result in different outcomes and, there-
fore, give different utilities to the agents [6]. So it is important that agents choose the
right procedure. Moreover, for a given procedure, it is also important that the agents
choose an appropriate agenda. The term agenda refers to the set of issues included for
negotiation [11]. The agenda is important because, irrespective of the procedure, the
outcome of negotiation depends on the agenda [7, 14]. Thus, given the utility maximiz-
ing feature of agents, it is important to ﬁnd what agenda maximizes their utility and is
therefore optimal for them. For example, consider a car dealer who has ﬁve second hand
cars to sell. A potential buyer may be interested in buying two of these. So he must ﬁrst
choose which two cars to negotiate the price for (i.e., from all possible subsets of sizetwo, he must choose the one that maximizes his utility and so is his optimal agenda).
Note that here, the buyer has choice over the agenda but not the seller.
Although the importance of agendas has been recognized [7, 11], most existing
work has taken the agenda as given and then analyzed the outcome for different proce-
dures [8, 5, 6]. But as the above example illustrates, the set of issues to be negotiated
themselves are often choice variables (i.e., what issues to negotiate can be chosen by
a negotiator) whose ultimate conﬁguration can have decisive effects on the negotiation
outcome [14]. Thus, in addition to knowing what procedure is best for an agent, it is
important to know what agenda maximizes an agent’s utility and is therefore its optimal
agenda. To this end, this paper analyzes the problem of ﬁnding optimal agendas in the
context of the PDP (future work will deal with SP and SQP). The key contribution of
this paper lies in presenting, for the ﬁrst time, polynomial time methods for determining
optimal agendas for the PDP.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of
related literature. Section 3 describes the setting and deﬁnes ‘agenda’ and ‘optimal
agenda’. Section 4 shows how to ﬁnd optimal agendas for the complete information
setting. Section 5 builds on Section 4 to show how to ﬁnd optimal agendas in an incom-
plete information setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are different procedures such as the PDP, the SP, and the SQP for multi-issue
negotiation, and the term agenda has different meanings in these different contexts. For
the PDP (which is the focus of this paper) and the SP, the term agenda refers to the
set of issues to be included for negotiation. But for the SQP, the term refers to not just
the set of issues to be included for negotiation but also the order in which they will be
negotiated.
Although the importance of agendas has been recognized [7, 11], most existing
work has taken the set of issues as given and then analyzed the equilibrium outcome
for different procedures [9, 8, 6]. In the context of the SQP, [1] takes the set of issues
to be negotiated as given and provides an analysis of the role of information and time
preferences on the equilibrium, while [4, 5] has dealt with taking the set of issues to be
negotiated as given and ﬁnding an optimal ordering for the given set. But as the example
outlined in the Introduction illustrates, the set of issues to be negotiated themselves
are often choice variables (i.e., what issues to negotiate can be chosen by a negotiator)
whose ultimate conﬁguration can have decisive effects on the negotiation outcome [14].
Thus, a negotiator must make three key choices: he/she must decide the following:
1. what negotiation procedure to use,
2. what set of issues to negotiate, and
3. for the SQP, what ordering to use for negotiating a given set of issues.
To our knowledge, there is no existing work that deals with ﬁnding what set of issues
to negotiate. Hence, the novelty of this paper lies in showing how to ﬁnd the set of
issues to negotiate. Speciﬁcally, it analyzes the problem of ﬁnding optimal agendas in
the context of the PDP. The key contribution of this paper lies in presenting, for the ﬁrst
time, polynomial time methods for determining optimal agendas for the PDP.3 The Negotiation Setting
An agent’s optimal agenda depends on its equilibrium utility from all possible agendas.
So we ﬁrst give an overview of the equilibrium for single and multi-issue negotiation.
On the basis of this equilibrium, we will show how to ﬁnd optimal agendas in Sections 4
and 5. A formal deﬁnition of optimal agenda is given toward the end of this section.
3.1 Equilibrium for Single Issue
Weusethesingleissuemodelof[6]inwhichtwoagents,aandb,negotiateoverasingle
divisible issue which is a ‘pie’ of size 1. The agents want to determine how to split it
between themselves. Let n 2 N+ be the deadline and 0 <   1 the discount factor for
both agents. The agents use an alternating offers protocol [12], which proceeds through
a series of time periods. One of the agents, say a, starts in the ﬁrst time period (i.e.,
t = 1) by making an offer (0  xa  1) to b. Agent b can accept/reject the offer. If it
accepts, negotiation ends in an agreement with a getting xa and b getting xb = 1   xa.
Otherwise, negotiation goes to the next time period, in which b makes a counter-offer.
This process continues until one of the agents either accepts an offer or quits negotiation
(resulting in a conﬂict).
Agent a’s utility at time t from a share xa is ua(xa;t) = xat 1 if t  n, otherwise
it is zero. For b, ub is analogous. For this setting, the equilibrium offers are obtained
using backward induction (BI) as follows. Let n = 1 and let a be the ﬁrst mover. If b
accepts a’s proposal at t = 1, the division occurs as agreed; if not, neither agent gets
anything (since the deadline is n = 1). Here, a is in a powerful position and is able to
keep 100% of the pie and give nothing to b1. Agent b accepts and agreement takes place
at t = 1.
Now, let n = 2 and  = 1=2. The ﬁrst mover (say a) decides what to offer at t = 1,
by looking ahead to t = 2 and reasoning backwards. Agent a reasons that if negotiation
goes to t = 2, b will take 100% of the shrunken pie by offering [0;1=2]. So, at t = 1, if
a offers b anything less than 1/2, b will reject the offer. So, at t = 1, a offers [1=2;1=2].
Agent b accepts and an agreement occurs at t = 1. In this way, BI was used to obtain
the equilibrium offer for t > 2.
3.2 Equilibrium for Multiple Issues for the PDP
Let I = f1;2;:::;mg be the set of issues. Agent a’s (b’s) preference for issue i is
represented with a weight wa
i 2 R+ (wb
i 2 R+). Each issue is a pie of size 1 and can
be split between the agents such that if xa
i and xb
i are a’s and b’s shares for issue i,
then xa
i + xb
i = 1. Here n is the deadline for all the issues, and  the discount factor
for all of them. Agent a’s cumulative utility at time t  n is given by Ua(I;xa;t) =
t 1 Pm
i=1 wa
i xa
i .Forb,Ub(I;xb;t)isanalogous.Asbefore,anagent’sutilityfort > n
is zero.
1 It is possible that b may reject such a proposal. But, irrespective of whether b accepts or rejects,
it gets zero utility (since the deadline is n = 1). So, b accepts a’s offer.For the above model, the equilibrium was obtained, using BI, as follows [6]. We
give an overview of this ﬁrst for complete information setting, and then explain its ex-
tension to an incomplete information setting.
The complete information setting. Let SA(t) (SB(t)) denote a’s (b’s) equilibrium strat-
egy for time t. For t = n, the offering agent gets a 100% of all the shrunken pies. For all
previous time periods, t < n, the offering agent (say a) proposes a package ([xa;xb])
such that b’s cumulative utility from it is what b would get from its own offer for t + 1.
If there is more than one such package, then a must choose the one that maximizes its
own cumulative utility. Thus, a must solve the following trade-off problem (called TA):
maximize
Pm
i=1 wa
i xa
i , subject to
Pm
i=1 wb
i(1   xa
i ) = Y where 0  xa
i  1. Here, Y
is b’s cumulative utility from its own offer SB(t+1). On the other hand, if a receives an
offer [xa;xb] at time t, then it accepts if Ua(I;xa;t) = Z where Z is a’s cumulative
utility from its own offer SA(t + 1). The equilibrium strategy for b (in terms of TB) is
analogous. Thus we have:
SA(n) =

OFFER [1, 0] If a’s turn to offer
ACCEPT If a’s turn to receive
where 0 (1) denotes a vector of m zeros (ones). For all preceding time periods t < n,
the strategies are as follows:
SA(t) =
8
<
:
OFFER TA If a’s turn to offer
If (Ua(I;xa;t)  Z) ACCEPT If a receives xa
else REJECT
For b, SB(t) is analogous. Both TA and TB are standard fractional knapsack problems
[3]. The solution to TA is for a to consider issues in ascending order of wa
i =wb
i and
allocate to b maximum possible share for the individual issues until b’s cumulative util-
ity equals Y . If the issues 1;:::;m are in ascending order of wa
i =wb
i, the equilibrium
solution is xa = f0;::;0;xa
c;1;::;1g, xb = f1;::;1;1 xa
c;0;::;0g. The solution to TB
is analogous.
An incomplete information setting. Here, the agents are uncertain about their utilities.
Let T be the number of possible utility function pairs. The jth possible pair (Ua
j ;Ub
j)
occurs with probability j. For a, the jth function is: Ua
j (I;xa;t) = t 1 Pm
i=1 wa
ijxa
i ,
and its expected utility is EUa(I;xa;t) = t 1 PT
j=1 j  Ua
j (I;xa;t). Agent a’s
expected weight for issue i is ewa
i = t 1 PT
j=1 jwa
ij. For b, Ub
j, EUb(I;xb;t), and
ewb
i are analogous.
Given this, agent a’s tradeoff problem at time t is to ﬁnd a package [xa;xb] that
solves the following problem:
TA-I maximize EUa(I;xa;t)
subject to EUb(I;xb;t) = EY 0  xa
i  1
Here I is ﬁxed and EY is b’s equilibrium utility for t + 1. Given this, a’s equilibrium
strategy for time t is the same as SA(t) (deﬁned earlier) with TA replaced with TA-I, andUa replaced with EUa. Likewise for agent b. The problem TA-I is also the standard
fractional knapsack problem, and is solvable using a greedy approach.
On the basis of the above equilibrium, we will show how to ﬁnd an optimal agenda,
for the PDP, for each agent.
3.3 The Negotiation Agenda
As noted in Section 1, in many cases, the set of issues to be negotiated are choice
variables. So, before negotiation begins, the agents must decide upon an agenda which
we deﬁne as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. In the context of the PDP, an agenda Ag of size g  m is a set of g issues,
i.e., Ag  I such that jAgj = g. Let AGg denote the set of all possible agendas of size
g.
Deﬁnition 2. For the PDP, an agenda (AAg) of size g  m is agent a’s optimal agenda
if
AAg = arg maxX2AGgEUa(X;xa;1)
where xa denotes a’s equilibrium allocation (for agenda X, for t = 1). For b, ABg is
analogous. For the complete information setting, EUa and EUb are replaced with Ua
and Ub respectively.
For the agenda I containing m issues, Section 3.2 showed how to ﬁnd equilibrium
outcomes (i.e., Ua, EUa, Ub, and EUb). Given this equilibrium, our problem now is to
ﬁnd each agent’s optimal agenda: AAg and ABg for 1  g  m. We show how to ﬁnd
these agendas in Section 4.
Below, we focus on the case where one of the agents, say a, prefers different issues
differently but b prefers all the issues equally2. So, for a, different issues have different
weights but b has the same3 weight for all the issues. We let the issues f1;:::;mg
be such that wa
i  wa
i+1 for 1  i  n   1. Also, for agenda X 2 AGg, we let
X = f1;:::;gg be such that wa
Xi  wa
Xi+1 for 1  i < g. Note that, although we are
viewing X as a list, as per its deﬁnition, an agenda is a set because the equilibrium for
the PDP is independent of the ordering of issues. However, we view X as a list because
it makes it easier to refer to the individual elements of X.
4 Optimal Agendas: Complete Information
We ﬁrst show how to ﬁnd optimal agenda for the complete information setting and then
for the incomplete information setting described in Section 3.2. For the complete in-
formation setting, Theorem 1 (Theorem 2) shows how to ﬁnd a’s (b’s) optimal agenda.
2 This is situation occurs often: for the previous car dealer example, a buyer may have different
preferences over the seat color and the car color, but the dealer may be indifferent between
colors.
3 Future work will deal with those situations where, for both a and b, the weights are different
for different issues.Then, for the incomplete information setting described in Section 3.2, Theorem 3 (The-
orem 4) gives a’s (b’s) optimal agenda. Theorem 5 gives the time complexity of com-
puting the optimal agendas.
Theorem 1. In a setting where agent a has different weights for different issues and b
has the same weight for all m issues, a’s optimal agenda of size g is a set of g issues
that are associated with the g highest weights in wa (i.e., AAg = fm g+1;:::;mg).
Proof. Here AAg is obtained using BI. If an agenda is optimal for a for the last time
period t = n, then by BI, it will be optimal for all previous ones. Consider the last
time period (t = n) for which two possibilities can arise: either a or b could be the
last mover. Consider ﬁrst the case where a is the last mover. As per the equilibrium
for the PDP, irrespective of the agenda, a gets a 100% of all the shrunken pies. So,
from among all possible agendas, its cumulative utility is maximized for the agenda
AAg = fm   g + 1;:::;mg.
Now, consider the case where b is the last mover. Here, as per the equilibrium for
PDP, b gets a 100% of all the shrunken pies and a gets nothing (i.e., a’s utility for t = n
is zero). Also, since b has equal weights for all the issues, its cumulative utility for t = n
is independent of the agenda. We therefore consider the previous time period (t = n 1)
for which it is a’s turn to offer. As per the equilibrium for t = n   1, b’s utility must
be equal to its equilibrium utility for t = n. If Ub denotes b’s equilibrium utility for
t = n, then in the equilibrium for t = n   1, b must get Ub. Note that since b has
equal weights, Ub is independent of the agenda. But a’s utility depends on the agenda.
Given Ub, a’s equilibrium utility for t = n   1 (for an agenda X 2 AGg) will be
Ua
X = (
Pg
i=1 wa
Xi) Ub. Then, a’s optimal agenda is the one that maximizesUa
X. Since
all weights are positive, and the issues in X = f1;:::;gg are in ascending order of wa
i ,
Ua
X is maximized when X = fm g +1;:::;mg. Thus, AAg = fm g +1;:::;mg.

Regarding b’s optimal agenda, one might think that ABg will be the set of g issues that
correspond to the g lowest weights for a. But this is not so, because an agent’s cumu-
lative utility from an agenda depends not just on its weights but also on its equilibrium
shares for the g issues. The following example clariﬁes this point.
Example 1. Let m = 4, I = f1;2;3;4g, g = 3,  = 0:5, n = 2, wa = f1;2;3;4g,
wb = f1;1;1;1g, and b be ﬁrst mover. There are four possible agendas of size g = 3:
f1;2;3g, f1;2;4g, f1;3;4g, and f2;3;4g. For each of them, the agents’ equilibrium
utilities for t = 1 (i.e., Ua
1 and Ub
1) are as given in Table 1. Agent b’s utility Ub
1 is high-
est for the agenda f1;2;4g, and so ABg = f1;2;4g is b’s optimal agenda. Likewise,
AAg = f2;3;4g.
As Example 1 shows, the optimal agenda may be different for different agents. But in
many practical cases, only one of the two agents has a choice over the agenda. This
is also the case in the car dealer example (outlined in Section 1) where the buyer can
choose an agenda but not the seller.
We will now show how to ﬁnd b’s optimal agenda AB
g using the following method.
Initially, the optimal agenda is empty. Then, we add issues to it one by one using a
greedy approach. For 1  k  g, let AB
g
k denote the issue that is b’s optimal choice at
step k. Then, b’s optimal agenda ABk of size k is ABk = [k
i=1AB
g
i .Agenda U
a
1 U
b
1 b’s Optimal Agenda?
f2;3;4g 4.5 1.833 No
f1;2;3g 3 2 No
f1;2;4g 3:5 2:125 Yes
f1;3;4g 4 2 No
Table 1. Agents’ utilities (for t = 1) for possible agendas.
Theorem 2. In a setting where agent a has different weights for different issues and b
has the same weight for all of them, b’s optimal agenda ABg (for g  2) is obtained as
follows. Agent b’s optimal choice for the ﬁrst two issues is:
AB
g
1 = 1 and AB
g
2 = m:
ThenAB
g
k (3  k  g)isgivenbythefollowingrule.Ifwelet[
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i = f1;:::;p;q;:::;mg
where (1  p < q  m) and (p + m   q + 1 = k   1), then if
m X
i=q
wa
i  
k 1 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i + wa
p+1 (1)
then AB
g
k = p + 1. Otherwise, if 9Z 2 I   [
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i such that
wa
Z +
m X
i=q
wa
i  
k 1 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i + wa
Z (2)
then if

k 1 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i 
m X
r=q
wa
AB
g
r (3)
then AB
g
k = p + 1. Otherwise (i.e., Eq. 2 or 3 is false), AB
g
k = q   1.
Proof. Anagent’soptimalagendaproblemexhibitsthe‘greedychoiceproperty’andthe
‘optimal sub-structure property’. So a globally optimal solution can be found by making
locally optimal choices. A problem has ‘optimal substructure’ if an optimal solution can
be constructed from optimal solutions to its subproblems. An agent’s optimal agenda
problem has both these properties since all weights are positive and so an agent’s
cumulative utility is maximized if its utility from the individual issues is maximized.
Given that b has equal weights for all the issues, b’s cumulative utility is maximized if
the issues are chosen such that its cumulative equilibrium share for them is the maxi-
mum over all possible agendas. So if xb
X denotes b’s equilibrium share for agenda X,
then ABg = arg maxX2AGg
Pg
i=1 xb
Xi or ABg = arg minX2AGg
Pg
i=1 xa
Xi (since,
xa
i = 1   xb
i). To ﬁnd ABg, we will choose one issue at a time. At step k (1  k  g)
we will choose AB
g
k such that a’s shares for the issues chosen thus far are minimized
(relative to all possible agendas of size k). In more detail, this is done as follows.As before, if an agenda is optimal for b for t = n, then by BI, it will be optimal for
all previous time periods. Now, either a or b could be the last mover. If it is a, it gets a
100% of all the shrunken pies and b gets zero utility. But if b is last mover, then it gets
a 100% of all shrunken pies and a gets nothing. So irrespective of who the last mover
is, b’s utility for t = n is independent of the agenda. Hence, we look at the previous
time period t = n   1 to ﬁnd ABg. Consider the case where b is the offering agent for
t = n   1. If xa
X denotes a’s equilibrium share for t = n   1, then b’s optimal agenda
for this time period is ABg = arg minX2AGg
Pg
i=1 xa
Xi.
To begin, we show how to ﬁnd the ﬁrst and second issues (i.e., AB
g
1 and AB
g
2) that
will be included in ABg. Then, we will show how to ﬁnd issues one by one (using a
greedy approach) to include in ABg until the number of issues in it is g. Let the m
issues f1;:::;mg be such that wa
i  wa
i+1 for 1  i < m   1. We decide what AB
g
1
and AB
g
2 should be on the basis of the relation between wa
AB
g
1 and wa
AB
g
2. Irrespective
of what these two issues are, there are two4 possible relations between their weights:
wa
AB
g
1 < wa
AB
g
2 or else wa
AB
g
1 > wa
AB
g
2. We consider each of these below.
For the case wa
AB
g
1 < wa
AB
g
2: At this stage, we know the relation between wa
AB
g
1 and
wa
AB
g
2 butnottheactualweights.Giventhisrelation,aspertheequilibriumfort = n 1
(see Section 3.2), b will ﬁrst allocate a share to a for the issue AB
g
2 and then for AB
g
1.
This will be done such that a’s cumulative utility (say Y ) from AB
g
1 and AB
g
2 is equal
to its cumulative utility for t = n (i.e., Y = n 1 P2
i=1 wa
AB
g
i ). When doing this
allocation for t = n   1, one of two possible cases (C1.1 or C1.2) can arise:
C1.1 The entire utility Y can be given to a from the issue AB
g
2 alone so a’s share for
AB
g
1 is zero, so we have:
wa
AB
g
2n 2  (wa
AB
g
1 + wa
AB
g
2)n 1 (4)
If xa
AB
g
2 denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
2 for t = n   1, then as per Sec-
tion 3.2, we have:
xa
AB
g
2 = (wa
AB
g
1 + wa
AB
g
2)n 1=wa
AB
g
2n 2 (5)
Clearly, it is optimal for b to choose AB
g
1 and AB
g
2 such that xa
AB
g
2 is minimized. In
Equation 5, since  is a constant, xa
AB
g
2 is minimized when wa
AB
g
1 is minimized and
wa
AB
g
2 is maximized. Thus, AB
g
1 is the issue with lowest weight in wa, and AB
g
2, is
the one with highest weight in wa. So AB
g
1 = 1 and AB
g
2 = m.
C1.2 The utility Y cannot be given just from the issue AB
g
2 so a’s share for AB
g
2 is
a 100% of it and its share for AB
g
1 is non-zero, so Equation 4 is false. If xa
AB
g
1
denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
1 for t = n   1, then as per Section 3.2, we
have:
(wa
AB
g
1xa
AB
g
1 + wa
AB
g
2)n 2 = (wa
AB
g
1 + wa
AB
g
2)n 1
4 For the case w
a
B1 = w
a
B2, the agents’ equilibrium shares are independent of w
a
AB
g
1 and w
a
AB
g
1.
This can be veriﬁed by substituting w
a
AB
g
1 = w
a
AB
g
1 in Equations 5 and 6.and
xa
AB
g
1 =   
wa
AB
g
2
wa
AB
g
1
(1   ) (6)
Here, xa
AB
g
1 is minimized when wa
AB
g
2 is maximized and wa
AB
g
1 is minimized. So
AB
g
1 = 1 and AB
g
2 = m.
Thus, if wa
AB
g
1 < wa
AB
g
2, then AB
g
1 = 1 and AB
g
2 = m for both cases (C1.1 and
C1.2).
For the case wa
AB
g
1 > wa
AB
g
2: This case is the same as the previous one, with wa
AB
g
1 and
wa
AB
g
2 swapped.
Now, we will choose AB
g
3. Since AB
g
1 = 1 and AB
g
2 = m, we have wa
1 < wa
AB
g
3 <
wa
m. So, in the equilibrium for t = n   1, b will ﬁrst allocate to a, a share for the issue
AB
g
2, then for AB
g
3, and ﬁnally for AB
g
1. In the equilibrium allocation for t = n   1,
a’s utility is Y = n 1 P3
i=1 wa
AB
g
i . We ﬁnd a’s equilibrium shares in this allocation
by considering the following three possible cases (C3.1 that corresponds to Equation 1
being true, C3.2 that corresponds to Equation 1 being false and Equation 2 being true,
or C3.3 that corresponds to Equations 1 and 2 being false) that can arise:
C3.1 The entire utility Y can be given to a from the issue AB
g
2 alone so a’s share for
AB
g
1 and AB
g
3 is each zero. So we have:
wa
AB
g
2n 2 
3 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i n 1 (7)
If xa
AB
g
2 denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
2 for t = n   1, then as per Sec-
tion 3.2, we have:
xa
AB
g
2 = (
3 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i )n 1=wa
AB
g
2n 2 (8)
Here, xa
AB
g
2 is minimized by choosing as AB
g
3 the issue with lowest weight from the
remaining issues in I fAB
g
1 [AB
g
2g. This gives AB
g
3 = 2. Moreover, Equation 7
is true iff AB
g
3 = 2 because, in I  fAB
g
1 [AB
g
2g, 2 is the issue with least weight.
C3.2 The utility Y cannot be given just from AB
g
2 but can be given from AB
g
2 and
AB
g
3. So a’s share for AB
g
2 is a hundred percent of it and its share for AB
g
3 is
non-zero, i.e., Equation 7 is false 8AB
g
3 2 I   fAB
g
1 [ AB
g
2g and 9AB
g
3 2
I   fAB
g
1 [ AB
g
2g s.t.:
(wa
AB
g
2 + wa
AB
g
3)n 2 
3 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i n 1 (9)
If xa
AB
g
3 denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
3 for t = n   1, then as per Sec-
tion 3.2, we have:
(wa
AB
g
3xa
AB
g
3 + wa
AB
g
2)n 2 =
3 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i n 1 (10)Solving the above equation for xa
AB
g
3, we get:
xa
AB
g
3 =
P2
i=1 wa
AB
g
i   wa
AB
g
2
wa
AB
g
3
+ 
Here, if Equation 3 is true, then xa
AB
g
3 is minimized if wa
AB
g
3 is maximized. So AB
g
3
must be the issue with lowest weight from the remaining issues, or AB
g
3 = 2. But if
Equation 3 is false, xa
AB
g
3 is minimized when AB
g
3 = m   1.
C3.3 The entire utility Y cannot be given from AB
g
2 and AB
g
3 so a’s share for each
of AB
g
2 and AB
g
3 is a hundred percent and its share for AB
g
1 is non-zero, i.e.,
Equations 7 and 9 are false 8AB
g
3 2 I   fAB
g
1 [ AB
g
2g , so:
(
3 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i )n 2 
3 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i n 1
If xa
AB
g
1 denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
1 for t = n   1, then as per Sec-
tion 3.2, we have:
(wa
AB
g
1xa
AB
g
1 + wa
AB
g
2 + wa
AB
g
3)n 2 =
3 X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i n 1
Solving the above equation for xa
AB
g
1, we get:
xa
AB
g
1 = (wa
AB
g
1 + wa
AB
g
2   wa
AB
g
2   wa
AB
g
3(1   ))=wa
AB
g
1
Here, xa
AB
g
1 is minimized when AB
g
3 = m   1.
Thus, for the case C3.1, AB
g
3 = 2. For C3.2, AB
g
3 = 2 or AB
g
3 = m   1 (depending
on Equation 3). And for C3.3 AB
g
3 = m   1.
In general, to decide what to choose as AB
g
k (4  k  g), we ﬁnd a’s equilibrium
allocation for each of the k issues (chosen thus far) for t = n 1. At stage k,we already
have the optimal agenda of size k   1, i.e., [
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i . Also, we know that for stage i,
(1  i  k   1) b’s optimal choice is either the issue with highest weight for a or else
the one with the lowest weight from the remaining issues I   f[
i 1
j=1AB
g
jg. Hence, as
mentioned in the statement of this theorem, we let [
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i = f1;:::;p;q;:::;mg
where (1  p < q  m) and (p+m q+1 = k 1). This implies that wa
p < wa
AB
g
k <
wa
q. Also, as before, the equilibrium allocation for k issues for t = n   1 must give
a a utility of Y = n 1 Pk
i=1 wa
AB
g
i . We ﬁnd a’s equilibrium shares in this allocation
by considering the following three possible cases (CK.1 that corresponds to Equation 1
being true, CK.2 that corresponds to Equation 1 being false and Equation 2 being true,
or CK.3 that corresponds to Equations 1 and 2 being false) that can arise:CK.1 ThecumulativeutilityY canbegiventoajustfromthepiesinfj;:::;mg(where
q  j  m) so we have5:
n 2
m X
r=j
wa
r  n 1
k X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i (11)
If xa
AB
g
k denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
k for t = n   1, then as per Sec-
tion 3.2, we have:
xa
j =
 

k X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i  
m X
r=j+1
wa
r

=wa
j (12)
Here, xa
j is minimized if wa
AB
g
k is minimized. So b’s optimal choice for AB
g
k is the
issue with lowest weight from the remaining issues I   f[
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i g, i.e., AB
g
k =
p+1. Moreover Equation 11 is true iff AB
g
k = p+1 because, in I  f[
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i g,
p + 1 is the issue with least weight.
CK.2 The entire utility Y cannot be given just from the pies in fq;:::;mg but can be
given from fq;:::;mg together with AB
g
k, i.e., 9AB
g
k 2 I   f[
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i g such
that:
n 2
m X
r=q
wa
r < n 1
k X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i ; and (13)
n 1 
wa
AB
g
kxa
AB
g
k +
m X
r=q
wa
r

 n 2
k X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i (14)
If xa
AB
g
k denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
k for t = n   1, then as per Sec-
tion 3.2, we have:
xa
AB
g
k =

Pk 1
i=1 wa
AB
g
i  
Pm
r=q wa
r
wa
AB
g
k
+  (15)
Here, if Equation 3 is true, then xa
AB
g
k is minimized if wa
AB
g
k is maximized, i.e.,
AB
g
k = p + 1. But if Equation 3 is false, xa
AB
g
k is minimized if wa
AB
g
k is minimized,
i.e., AB
g
k = q   1.
CK.3 The cumulative utility Y cannot be given just from the pies in fAB
g
k;q;:::;mg
but can be given from fj;:::;r;AB
g
k;q;:::;mg where 1  j  p, so we have:
n 2(wa
AB
g
k +
m X
r=q
wa
r) < n 1
k X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i ; and
5 Here, a’s share for each of the pies j + 1;:::;m is one, for pie j it is x
a
j, and for each of the
pies 1;:::;j   1, is zero.n 1 
p X
r=j
wa
r + wa
AB
g
k +
m X
r=q
wa
r

 n 2
k X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i
If xa
AB
g
k denotes a’s equilibrium share for AB
g
k for t = n   1, then as per Sec-
tion 3.2, we have:
xa
j =
 

k X
i=1
wa
AB
g
i  
m X
r=q
wa
r   wa
AB
g
k  
p X
r=j+1
wa
r

=wa
j
Here xa
j is minimized when wa
AB
g
k is maximized. So AB
g
k must be the issue with
highest weight from the remaining issues I   f[
k 1
i=1 AB
g
i g, i.e., AB
g
k = q   1.
Thus, for the case CK.1, AB
g
k = p + 1. For CK.2, AB
g
k = p + 1 or AB
g
k = q   1
(depending on Equation 3). And for CK.3, AB
g
k = q   1.
In the same way, we can obtain b’s optimal agenda for the case where a is the
offering agent at t = n   1. 
5 Optimal Agendas: Incomplete Information
We will now show how to ﬁnd optimal agendas for the incomplete information setting
of Section 3.2. To this end, Theorem 3 gives a’s optimal agenda and Theorem 4 that for
b. Finally, Theorem 5 gives the time complexity of computing these optimal agendas.
Let the m issues f1;:::;mg be such that: ewa
1  ewa
2  :::  ewa
m. Here, agent a has
different expected weights for different issues, but b has the same expected weight for
all the m issues.
Theorem 3. In a setting where agent a has different expected weights for different
issues but, for b, the set of possible weights for an issue and the associated proba-
bilities are the same for all the m issues, agent a’s optimal agenda of size g is a
set of g issues that are associated with the g highest expected weights (i.e., AAg =
fm   g + 1;:::;mg).
Proof. As Theorem 1, with weights replaced with corresponding expected weights and
utilities with corresponding expected utilities. 
Theorem 4. In a setting where agent a has different expected weights for different is-
sues but, for b, the set of possible weights for an issue and the associated probabilities
are the same for all the m issues, b’s optimal agenda ABg (for g  2) is obtained as
in Theorem 2 with agent’s weights replaced with corresponding expected weights, and
utilities replaced with corresponding expected utilities.
Proof. As Theorem 2, with weights replaced with corresponding expected weights and
utilities with corresponding expected utilities. 
Theorem 5. For the complete information setting, the time taken to compute AAg is
O(g) and to compute ABg is O(mg2). For the incomplete information setting, the time
to compute AAg is O(Tg) and to compute ABg is O(Tmg2).Proof. For the complete information setting, as per Theorem 1, AAg is the set of g
issues with highest weight in wa. We therefore need to choose the last g issues from
 which takes time O(g). For ABg, as per Theorem 2, determining AB
g
k (1  k 
g) requires evaluating the conditions in Equations 1, 2, and 3. Consider Equation 2
which requires one comparison between wa
Z +
Pm
i=q wa
i and 
Pk 1
i=1 wa
AB
g
i + wa
Z.
Computation of these two terms to compare requires no more than k additions because
the summation variable i varies between 1 and k. Also, Z can vary at most between 1
and m. So ﬁnding AB
g
k takes O(mk) time, and to ﬁnd AB
g
k for 1  k  g, it takes Pg
k=1 O(mk) = O(mg2) time. Note that we considered only Equation 2 because the
time to evaluate the condition in Equations 1 or 3 is no more than the time taken to
evaluate the condition in Equation 2.
It follows that, for the incomplete information setting, if there are T possible utility
function pairs, the time to compute AAg is O(Tg) and to compute ABg is O(Tmg2).

6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented polynomial time methods for ﬁnding each agent’s optimal agenda
for the PDP. The polynomial time complexity of our methods makes it easy for automat-
ing the process of choosing an agent’s optimal agenda, and thereby reducing human
involvement during negotiation.
Possible avenues for future research include extending the current analysis to sce-
narios where both agents have different weights for different issues. Also, this paper
focussed on one speciﬁc incomplete information setting. In future, we will extend this
analysis to other possible incomplete information settings.Bibliography
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